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Academic Freedom and Tenure: 
The University of Illinois1 
Part I. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee 
Dr. Leo F. Koch, Assistant Professor of Biology in 
the Division of General Studies at the University of 
Illinois, Urbana, was suspended from his academic duties 
on April 7, I960, by President David D. Henry because 
of a letter written by Professor Koch and published 
in The Daily Mini, the campus paper, on March 18, 
I960. On June 14, I960, the Board of Trustees of the 
University ordered that Professor Koch be discharged 
and that his contract, which ran until August 31, 1961, 
be terminated as of the end of the current academic year, 
^he text of this report was written in the first instance by 
the members of the ad hoc investigating committee. In accord- 
ance with Association practice, the text was then submitted for 
consideration by the Association's standing Committee on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure (Committee A), to Professor 
Koch and to the Administration of the University of Illinois. 
In the light of comments and suggestions received, and with 
the editorial assistance of the Association staff, the report has 
been revised for publication. The reply of the Administration 
offered several corrections on matters it stated were not involved 
in Professor Koch's then pending appeal in litigation he had 
instituted against the University; it was accompanied also by 
preliminary observations of considerable length, which it au- 
thorized to be released to the ad hoc committee and Committee 
A, which President Henry had received from the University's 
legal counsel after the latter's review of the draft text. The 
University, however, made clear that because of the pending 
appeal, it was of the view that adequate institutional comment 
on the report could not be accomplished and that accordingly 
it was constrained to defer formulation and presentation of a 
formal public statement of University position on the report 
until an appropriate later time. Following affirmance by the 
Illinois Appellate Court of the trial court decision, the Associa- 
tion again made inquiry of the Administration; the reply received 
called attention to the fact that Professor Koch was still in 
a position either to file a request for leave to appeal the matter 
to the Illinois Supreme Court or a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Further com- 
munications between the Association and the Administration 
ensued, but did not result in receipt of any further comments 
from the University on the content of the report. The Associa- 
tion has concluded that in view of the present posture of the 
litigation and the focus, in any event, of the report on academic 
rather than legal judgments, it is appropriate to publish this 
report. 
Immediately following this report will be found: (l) a 
separate statement by the ad hoc committee on "academic re- 
sponsibility," and (2) comments on "academic responsibility" by 
individual members of Committee A. 
that is, on August 31, I960. On complaint of Professor 
Koch and the University of Illinois Chapter of the Asso- 
ciation that the suspension, discharge and termination 
of contract constituted a violation of academic freedom, 
the General Secretary appointed the undersigned com- 
mittee to investigate conditions of academic freedom and 
tenure at the University of Illinois, with particular 
reference to the case of Professor Koch. 
The basic documents in the case were made available 
to the committee and on May 7, 8, and 9, 1961, the 
committee visited the campus of the University of Illinois 
at Urbana. The committee received full courtesy • and 
cooperation from the University authorities and all others 
concerned. It interviewed all the chief participants in the 
Koch matter, with the exception of Professor Koch him- 
self, who was in California. On June 2, two members of 
the committee, Professors Butts and Emerson, interviewed 
Professor Koch in Washington, D. C. 
I. Statement of Facts in the Koch Case 
The essential facts in the Koch case are matters of 
written record and are not in dispute. Our summary 
below is based upon this documentary material, supple- 
mented by certain additional facts obtained in our in- 
vestigation. 
Background of Professor Koch 
Professor Koch received the degree of Bachelor of 
Science in 1941 from the University of California at 
Berkeley and, following service with the armed forces 
during the war, obtained a master's degree in 1948 and 
a Ph.D. in 1950, both in botany, from the University of 
Michigan. After teaching at Bakersfield College and 
Tulane University from 1951 to 1955 he was appointed 
Assistant Professor of Biology in the Division of General 
Studies at the University of Illinois and began his teach- 
ing duties there in September, 1955. In 1957, the Uni- 
versity of Illinois renewed his contract for two years. 
The contract was renewed again in 1959, but Professor 
Koch was notified that this appointment was a terminal 
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one and would not be continued after the contract expired 
on August 31, 1961. Inasmuch as the charges against 
Professor Koch and the subsequent action taken by the 
University were predicated entirely upon the letter of 
March 18, I960, the bases of the decision to give 
Professor Koch a terminal appointment are not relevant 
to the issues in this case and were not inquired into by 
the committee. 
Publication of the Letter of March 18 
On March 16, I960, The Daily lllini published an 
article by two students entitled "Sex Ritualized." This 
article described scenes at a sorority house, a little past 
midnight, of couples "smooching and now and then 
mumbling passionately"; discussed the social pressures 
which require girls on dates to stay out until the curfew 
hour of one o'clock arrives; decried the fact that on 
campus dates men were not concerned with a girl "as a 
living individual," but "as a simple female sex unit"; 
and concluded: 
Haven't our male-female relations on campus, in general, 
stultified into a predetermined ritual? It is our opinion 
that they have, and we think that nearly every student 
has ample evidence at hand to show this to be the case. 
We write this article because most students do not seem 
to recognize the obvious. They cannot recognize reality 
because they do not want to recognize reality. They fear 
it. People fear and seem incapable of opening their souls 
to one another - especially to one of the opposite sex! 
Professor Koch's letter, written in response to the 
above article, was published on March 18. Its full text 
is as follows: 
To the Editor: 
You have made a great show of liberalism in racial 
problems whose center of physical and emotional dis- 
turbance is a safe, 1,000 miles away. I will be interested 
to see how your social conscience operates with a problem 
which strikes very close to home, here on campus. 
The problem is broached by Dick Hutchison and Dan 
Bures in their article, "Sex Ritualized" (16 March) under 
the heading, "Off the Cuff" on your editorial page. 
Hutchison and Bures are to be commended for their 
courage in candidly discussing the sexual problems of 
college students, even if only with narrow-minded, if 
not entirely ignorant, perspective. 
Their discussion omits entirely any reference to the 
social meleu [sic] which compels healthy, sexually mature 
human animals into such addictions (of which masturba- 
tion is likely the least objectionable) to unhealthy and 
degenerative practices. 
The first hazard encountered by the frank discussion 
in public of sexual problems is the widespread moralistic 
attitude that where there is smoke, there is fire. Any 
one who insists on speaking about sex in public, say the 
orthodox moralists, (unless it is condemned soundly) 
must be a sexual deviate (a Queer) in their orthodox 
view. 
The second, and by far the more important, hazard 
is that a public discussion of sex will offend the religious 
feelings of the leaders of our religious institutions. These 
people feel that youngsters should remain ignorant of 
sex for fear that knowledge of it will lead to temptation 
and sin. 
Hence we have the widespread crusades against ob- 
scenity which are so popular among prudes and puri- 
tanical old-maids. Bachelors are known to be immune to 
this disease inasmuch as they are the favored sex in a 
double standard of morality which accepts as respectable 
premarital sexual experience for men but not for women. 
This occasions some difficulty as most men are hetero- 
sexually inclined. 
Thus we come to the crux of the problem which is not 
even hinted at by Hutchison and Bures. Their article 
would lead a casual reader [to believe] that the evils 
portrayed by them are due only to the depravity of the 
individuals they observed, whereas, in fact, the heavy 
load of blame should fall on the depraved society which 
reared them. 
I submit that the events described by Hutchison and 
Bures are merely symptoms of a serious social malaise 
which is caused primarily by the hypocritical and down- 
right inhumane moral standards engendered by a 
Christian code of ethics which was already decrepit in 
the days of Queen Victoria. 
College students, when faced with this outrageously 
ignorant code of morality, would seem to me, to be acting 
with remarkable decorum, and surprising meekness, if 
they do no more than neck at their social functions. 
Perhaps it would be nearer to the truth to say that 
such meek and very frustrating, no doubt, behavior in- 
dicates an extreme degree of brainwashing by our 
religious and civil authorities in the name of virtue and 
purity, to the point where the students have become 
psychologically inhibited from satisfying their needs in 
more obvious and healthy ways. 
With modern contraceptives and medical advice readily 
available at the nearest drugstore, or at least a family 
physician, there is no valid reason why sexual inter- 
course should not be condoned among those sufficiently 
mature to engage in it without social consequences and 
without violating their own codes of morality and ethics. 
A mutually satisfactory sexual experience would 
eliminate the need for many hours of frustrating petting 
and lead to much happier and longer lasting marriages 
among our younger men and women. 
Leo F. Koch 
Assistant Professor of Biology* 
Members of the faculty frequently write letters to The 
Daily lllini or to other newspapers. Most often these 
2 The letter as published was headed, "Advice on Sex." This 
caption was inserted by the editor of The Daily lllini without 
the knowledge of Professor Koch, and was not considered by the 
University officials as part of the letter. 
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letters are signed by the writer without designation of 
his faculty title, but it is not uncommon for the author 
to identify himself by adding his faculty title to his 
name. 
Applicable University Regulations 
The University Statutes provide that the tenure of any 
faculty member whether appointed for an indefinite or 
a definite term, may be terminated by retirement, resigna- 
tion, or "discharge for cause" [Sec. 38(c)]. The latter 
term is defined as follows in Section 38 (d): 
(d) Cause for discharge shall consist of conduct 
seriously prejudicial to the University through deliberate 
infraction of law or commonly accepted standards of 
morality, neglect of duty, inefficiency or incompetency. 
The enumeration of causes for discharge shall not be 
deemed exclusive, and the Board of Trustees reserves the 
power to discharge for other causes, but it is to be 
distinctly understood that this power will be exercised 
only under exceptional circumstances and then only for 
conduct which is clearly prejudicial to the best interests 
of the University. 
Section 39 of the statutes provides in part: 
Sec. 39. (a) It is the policy of the University to 
maintain and encourage full freedom, within the law, 
of inquiry, discourse, teaching, research, and publication 
and to protect any member of the academic staff against 
influences, from within or without the University, which 
would restrict him in the exercise of these freedoms in 
his area of scholarly interest. . . . 
(b) In his role as citizen, the faculty member has 
the same freedoms as other citizens, without institutional 
censorship or discipline, although he should be mindful 
that accuracy, forthrightness, and dignity befit his asso- 
ciation with the University and his position as a man of 
learning. 
(c) These freedoms do not include the right to advo- 
cate the overthrow of our constitutional form of govern- 
ment by force or violence. . . . 
The procedure for termination is established by Section 
38(c) and (f ) : 
(e) An appointee on definite tenure shall not be re- 
moved before the expiration of his term of service, nor 
shall an appointee on indefinite tenure be removed, with- 
out in either instance first having been presented with a 
written statement of the charges against him, which shall 
be sufficiently specific reasonably to inform him of their 
nature and to enable him to present his defense thereto. 
Charges shall be preferred by the President, or on his 
authority, and shall be filed with the Secretary of the 
Board of Trustees. A copy of the charges shall be trans- 
mitted to the appointee either personally or shall be 
mailed to the appointee at his last known post-office 
address by registered mail within 15 days after they have 
been preferred. Within 15 days after such service of a 
copy of the charges, the appointee may file with the 
Secretary of the Board a written request for a hearing 
before the Board of Trustees. Notice of the time and 
place of the hearing, which shall be not less than 20 days 
after the date of the appointee's request, shall be served 
upon the appointee either personally or by registered 
mail. The date of the hearing shall be no less than 15 
days from the date of the receipt of the notice of hearing, 
by the appointee. The appointee shall have the right to 
appear at the hearing, with counsel, if he desires, to reply 
to the charges and to present evidence in his behalf. The 
Board shall not be bound by formal or technical rules of 
evidence in hearing and deciding the case. Prior to the 
preferment of charges, or while charges are pending, the 
appointee may be suspended by the President pending 
final decision of the Board upon the charges. . . . 
(f ) Any member of the faculty of the University, who 
claims that termination of his services would violate 
principles of academic freedom, shall have the right to a 
hearing before the Committee on Academic Freedom of 
the appropriate Senate prior to a hearing, if any, before 
the Board of Trustees. Such hearings shall be conducted 
in accordance with established rules of procedure. The 
Committee shall make findings of fact and recommenda- 
tions to the President of the University. The several 
Committees may, from time to time, establish their own 
rules of procedure. 
Events from March 18 to President Henry's Letter of 
April 7 
The publication of Professor Koch's letter on Friday, 
March 18, created an immediate stir at the University 
and beyond. According to Royden Dangerfield, Associate 
Provost and Dean of Administration, the letter reached 
President Henry on the day of publication and President 
Henry asked him (Dangerfield) to look into the matter. 
The letter was widely discussed on the campus and in 
the local press. Under date of March 25, the Rev. Ira 
H. Latimer, of the Institute of Economic Policy, Chicago, 
and a member of the University of Illinois Dads' Associ- 
ation, sent a four-page communication to the parents 
of a substantial number of women students. In this 
letter Mr. Latimer reprinted the Koch letter and 
denounced it as "an audacious attempt to subvert the 
religious and moral foundations of America" which 
followed the "standard operating procedure of the Com- 
munist conspiracy." As a result of the Latimer communi- 
cation and the other publicity, the University authorities 
received numerous letters of protest. 
Professor Koch's immediate superiors on the faculty 
were Professor Otto E. Kugler, Chairman of Biological 
Science in the Division of General Studies, and Professor 
James M. McCrimmon, Head of the Division of General 
Studies. Professor McCrimmon, who was on sabbatical 
leave, stated that the Koch letter was called to his atten- 
tion on the Friday of publication by his secretary and 
members of the DGS staff; that at first he decided to do 
nothing about it but "waited to see if it would blow 
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over." At the beginning of the following week, however, 
Professor McCrimmon was called by Associate Provost 
Dangerfield and asked to come in for a conference with 
him and Lyle H. Lanier, then Dean of the College of 
Liberal Arts and Sciences. At this conference, according 
to Professor McCrimmon, Associate Provost Dangerfield 
stated that President Henry was much disturbed about 
the letter and wanted them to make recommendations to 
him as to what action would be proper. The matter was 
discussed and three possible courses of action were out- 
lined and reported to President Henry: (1) reprimand, 
(2) relief from classes, and (3) dismissal. Professor 
McCrimmon stated that no definite recommendation was 
made at this meeting, that he had no knowledge of what 
official action would be taken, and that he understood 
that action would be taken at the College level. 
On March 25 Professor McCrimmon, apparently on 
his own initiative, called in Professor Koch for an inter- 
view with himself and Professor Kugler. In a subsequent 
memorandum summarizing the meeting, Professor Mc- 
Crimmon said, "I told Koch that I had asked for the 
meeting to .tell him what his colleagues in DGS and I, 
personally, thought of his recent letter in the lll'ini and 
that I had put these thoughts into a letter which he would 
get as soon as it could be typed and delivered." The 
meeting lasted 25 minutes. Professor McCrimmon stated 
his objections to the Koch letter, and Professor Koch 
made a brief reply. Professor McCrimmon also informed 
Professor Koch that "the President and Dean are con- 
cerned," but did not state whether or not further action 
would be taken. On the following day Professor Mc- 
Crimmon mailed his letter of reprimand to Professor 
Koch. 
The next action was a meeting of the Executive Com- 
mittee of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences on 
March 28. This Committee is elected by all members 
of the faculty of the College having the rank of in- 
structor or higher; at that time it consisted of the Dean, 
the Associate Dean and five other members, of whom 
four were Department Heads and one was an Associate 
Department Head. No final decision was reached on 
March 28 and a second meeting of the Executive Com- 
mittee was held on April 6. At neither meeting did the 
Executive Committee call in or communicate with Pro- 
fessor Koch. Nor did it consult with Professors Mc- 
Crimmon or Kugler, although memoranda from them 
summarizing their interview with Professor Koch, and 
the letter of reprimand, were before the Committee at 
its second meeting. 
On April 7, Dean Lanier, as Chairman of the Executive 
Committee, reported by letter to President Henry the 
recommendations of the Committee. Dean Lanier's letter 
summarized the McCrimmon-Kugler memoranda and 
the letter of reprimand, and enclosed copies of these 
documents. It went on: 
The Committee's attention . . . was directed primarily 
to the question of whether or not Dr. Koch's published 
letter constituted a breach of academic responsibility so 
serious as to justify a recommendation that he be relieved 
of his University duties. It was voted at the meeting on 
April 6 to make such a recommendation (one member 
did not concur). 
It was voted further to recommend that Dr. Koch's 
salary be continued for the remainder of the present 
academic year. Three of the six members of the Com- 
mittee - including myself - felt that some kind of addi- 
tional financial settlement should be arranged to cover 
the second year of his contract - not because of any 
legal obligation to do so in the circumstances, but 
primarily out of consideration for the economic jeopardy 
in which Dr. Koch's irresponsible action has placed his 
family. 
On the same day, April 7, President Henry addressed 
the following letter to Dean Lanier: 
I have your memorandum of April 7 reporting the 
deliberations of the Executive Committee of the College of 
Liberal Arts and Sciences concerning Assistant Professor 
Leo F. Koch. You report that Professor Koch's letter 
published in the Daily lllini on March 18, I960 raised 
serious doubt as to his sense of academic responsibility 
and hence as to his further usefulness as a teacher in the 
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. 
I note that the Head of Professor Koch's Department, 
Professor James M. McCrimmon, in substance informed 
Professor Koch on March 25 that his letter constituted 
a breach of professional responsibility and in conference 
with Professor Koch condemned both the tone and much 
of the content of the letter. 
I note further that it is the Executive Committee's view 
that Professor Koch's published letter constitutes a breach 
of academic responsibility so serious as to justify his 
being relieved of his University duties. 
This memorandum is to record my concurrence in the 
recommendation of the Committee and to request you to 
relieve Professor Koch of his duties immediately. His 
appointment will be terminated at the University at the 
end of the current academic year. 
With you, I consider Professor Koch's letter a grave 
breach of academic responsibility. The views expressed 
are offensive and repugnant, contrary to commonly ac- 
cepted standards of morality and their public espousal 
may be interpreted as encouragement of immoral be- 
havior. It is clear that Mr. Koch's conduct has been 
prejudicial to the best interests of the University. 
I request that you and Professor McCrimmon com- 
municate this decision to Professor Koch. 
David D. Henry 
President 
cc: Professor Leo F. Koch 
Professor James M. McCrimmon 
Members of the Executive Committee, 
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences 
Provost Gordon N. Ray 
Mr. A. J. Janata, Secretary, Board of Trustees 
Members of the Board of Trustees 
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President Henry's letter of April 7 was released to 
the public with an accompanying press release. Copies 
were sent to the members of the Board of Trustees. 
It will be noted that under Section 38 (e) of the 
University Statutes, quoted above, President Henry had 
no authority to discharge Professor Koch or terminate 
his contract, his power being limited to filing charges and 
suspension of the appointee "pending final decision of the 
Board upon the charges." President Henry explained the 
flat statement in his letter - that Professor Koch's "ap- 
pointment will be terminated at the University at the end 
of the current academic year" - on the ground that persons 
connected with the University knew he had no power 
to discharge and would understand that his letter was 
only a recommendation to the Board of Trustees. The 
investigating committee for the Association has en- 
countered a variety of recollection on the question 
whether President Henry was advised that he had no 
power to discharge a faculty member (1) while the 
April 7 letter was in draft form, or (2) after it had 
been sent to Professor Koch. In any event it seems clear 
that the letter was interpreted by the public, and very 
likely by substantial segments of the University, as 
constituting a final discharge. President Henry made no 
effort to clarify the situation by subsequent public state- 
ment. 
Hearing and Decision of the Senate Committee on Aca- 
demic Freedom 
On April 8, after receiving a copy of President Henry's 
letter to Dean Lanier, Professor Koch asked for a hearing 
before the Senate Committee on Academic Freedom of 
the Urbana-Champaign campus. The Senate of the Ur- 
bana-Champaign campus is composed of all faculty mem- 
bers on that campus holding full professorial rank, the 
deans of the colleges and directors of the schools and 
institutes, heads of departments, and certain other aca- 
demic and administrative personnel; a few persons below 
the rank of full professor are members by virtue of their 
election to membership on Senate Committees. The 
Academic Freedom Committee is elected annually by the 
Senate. The Committee held its hearings on April 18 and 
19. The charges against Professor Koch consisted of 
President Henry's letter of April 7, which was construed 
by the Committee to incorporate by reference Dean 
Lanier's letter of April 7 and its accompanying documents. 
Witnesses before the Committee were Professor Koch, 
Dean Lanier, and President Henry, who were heard 
separately and in private. 
The Senate Committee made its report on May 13. 
Its conclusions were: 
(1) A faculty member has the right to express views 
on sexual behavior, as on other subjects, which may be 
considered "offensive and repugnant," "contrary to com- 
monly accepted standards of morality," and to criticize 
prevailing views. 
(2) Professor Koch committed a breach of academic 
responsibility, "not because he publicly expressed con- 
troversial views on sexual mores, but because of the way 
in which he expressed them, and because of the circum- 
stances under which he caused his letter to be published 
in the Daily lllini." 
(3) The administrative officers of the University 
"acted in several respects contrary to the standards of 
proper procedure in dismissal cases" in that (a) the Presi- 
dent exceeded his authority in announcing publicly that 
Professor Koch's contract would be terminated; (b) the 
University gave wide publicity to the charges; (c) Pro- 
fessor Koch did not receive a hearing prior to the recom- 
mendation for suspension and contract termination; and 
(d) the charges were formulated in a different manner 
in President Henry's letter than they were in Dean 
Lanier's letter. "While Professor Koch has not been 
denied his statutory rights to hearings before this com- 
mittee and before the Board of Trustees, the foregoing 
procedural defects may well have prejudiced the final 
outcome of his case." 
(4) "The publication of Professor Koch's letter has 
been prejudicial to the best interest of the University, 
in that it may have damaged the standing of the Uni- 
versity in the eyes of many people in the State of Illinois; 
the administration therefore had a legitimate concern 
with this damage and valid reason for action to minimize 
it." But "strict application of this standard to justify 
discharge would discourage expression of unpopular views 
and thus seriously impair any meaningful academic 
freedom." 
(5) The failure of the University to use proper pro- 
cedure, President Henry's sweeping formulation of the 
charges, and the premature publicity given the charges 
"have been prejudicial to the standing of the University 
in the academic community in this country and abroad." 
"The discharge of an academic staff member for cause 
deemed as prejudicial to the best interests of the Uni- 
versity because of adverse public reaction may alarm the 
academic community and cause even greater harm." Such 
damage should be avoided and, to the extent it has already 
occurred, "it, too, calls for remedial action." 
(6) In the opinion of three members, "discharge 
would be so excessive a penalty as to constitute a violation 
of Professor Koch's academic freedom." In the opinion 
of three other members, Professor Koch's action was a 
sufficiently clear violation of academic responsibility to 
invalidate his claim to the protection of academic 
freedom, but that the general interests of academic 
freedom at this University would not be served by his 
^discharge." 
On the basis of the above conclusions the Senate 
Committee recommended unanimously: 
(1) That Professor Koch be reprimanded for his 
action and admonished to act in keeping with the dignity 
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and responsibility of a scholar, but not be discharged. 
(2) That the Statutes of the University of Illinois 
be revised so as to assure a faculty member that, in the 
case of a discharge action against him, definite fair 
procedures will be followed, in particular, an adequate 
opportunity to defend himself before a properly elected 
committee of his peers prior to any suspension, and, in 
any case, prior to a recommendation for discharge. 
(3) That the University administrative officers clearly 
state that the University does not consider the expression 
of views, however contrary to prevailing opinions, as, in 
itself, a violation of academic responsibility, provided it 
is made in conformity with the legal and statutory re- 
straints imposed on a faculty member as a citizen, a 
teacher, and a scholar. 
The report of the Senate Committee was made avail- 
able to the Board of Trustees and to Professor Koch and 
his counsel, but was not made public until the hearing 
of the Board of Trustees on June 14. 
Hearing and Decision of the Board of Trustees 
Professor Koch had, on April 11, requested a hearing 
before the Board of Trustees, and the Board, at its meet- 
ing on April 20, granted the request. Following the 
report of the Senate Committee on Academic Freedom, 
President Henry submitted to the Board of Trustees a 
recommendation that it terminate Professor Koch's ap- 
pointment at the end of the current academic year (i.e., 
August 31, I960), but requested that the Board defer 
action on his recommendation until the hearing requested 
by Professor Koch had been held. The Board then fixed 
June 14, I960, as the date of the hearing. 
At the hearing before the Board, counsel for the 
University and counsel for Professor Koch joined in in- 
troducing a stipulation of facts, which consisted largely 
of a statement of events based upon the documents sum- 
marized above. Counsel for the University also offered 
in evidence the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure jointly adopted by the American As- 
sociation of University Professors and the Association of 
American Colleges and a section of the "Code on Under- 
graduate Student Affairs of the University of Illinois" 
dealing with student discipline. These were admitted over 
the objection of counsel for Professor Koch. Counsel for 
the University likewise asked the Board to take adminis- 
trative notice of certain "commonly accepted standards of 
morality which prevail in the community in which the 
Urbana-Champaign campus of the University of Illinois 
is located," which the Board did over objection. No other 
evidence was produced by either side. Professor Koch 
was present but did not testify. The Board then heard 
oral arguments from both sides. 
At the close of the argument counsel for the University 
submitted a detailed statement of Suggested Findings 
and Conclusions. The Board then retired into executive 
session. It reconvened the public hearing approximately 
an hour later and, upon motion of one of its members, 
voted unanimously to adopt the findings and conclusions 
submitted by counsel for the University and to approve 
and adopt the recommendation of the President that 
Professor Koch's appointment and contract be terminated 
as of August 31, I960. 
The basic findings adopted by the Board of Trustees, 
in addition to those setting forth the course of events 
established by the documentary evidence, were as follows: 
(1) That it was Professor Koch's "intention not only 
to condone sexual intercourse between students enrolled 
in and attending the University of Illinois who are not 
married to each other but that he also intended thereby 
to encourage and espouse such immoral conduct upon the 
part of such students." 
(2) That Professor Koch's letter of March 18 "was 
not a reasoned statement, marshalling evidence in support 
of views held by him, but was one in which, through the 
use of overstatement and ridicule, he denounced society 
as depraved, condemned as inhumane and obsolete the 
widely accepted moral standards derived from the Chris- 
tian code of ethics and the commonly accepted moral 
standards then prevailing in the community . . . , and 
in which he castigated those who might disagree with 
his conclusions as outrageously ignorant; and . . . that 
the language of that letter was not in keeping with those 
standards of temperateness, dignity, and respect for the 
opinions of others which should characterize public ex- 
pression by members of the faculty of the University of 
Illinois." It also found that the letter did not adhere to 
required standards of accuracy, and that Professor Koch 
had not made plain he was not writing as "a spokesman 
for the University." 
(3) That Professor Koch's action in publishing the 
letter, "taken together with the language, tone, and con- 
tents of the letter, constituted a decidedly serious and 
reprehensible breach of the academic and professional 
responsibility owed by Assistant Professor Koch to the 
University of Illinois, which has caused great concern to 
the parents of students attending the University and to 
citizens of the State of Illinois as to the moral standards 
which prevail and are maintained at the University, which 
has been and is clearly prejudicial to the best interests of 
the University of Illinois and which has so seriously im- 
paired his usefulness to the University that its best in- 
terests would clearly be further and seriously prejudiced 
by continuing to keep him in its employ." 
(4) That Professor Koch "has been granted and has 
received all of the procedural rights and all rights to 
hearings granted him by the provisions of the University 
of Illinois Statutes in connection with this entire proceed- 
ing." 
(5) That the action of President Henry in releasing 
to the press his letter of April 7 "was rendered desirable, 
appropriate, and proper in view of the publicity" Pro- 
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fessor Koch's letter had received, and "also because of 
the desirability and necessity created thereby that the dis- 
avowal by the University administration to the views 
expressed by Assistant Professor Koch in his said letter 
reach and be made known to the citizens of the State 
of Illinois and the parents of students"; and that the 
release to the public press did not "operate to his prej- 
udice in the consideration and disposition which this 
Board of Trustees is making of the charges preferred." 
In its Conclusions the Board stated that the "tone, 
language, and content" of Professor Koch's letter were 
such that his publishing it "constituted a grave breach 
of his academic and professional responsibility and duty 
to the University of Illinois, the students attending the 
University, and the citizens of the State of Illinois." It 
went on to say: 
We recognize that the limits of academic freedom 
cannot be defined by the test of conformity or non- 
conformity between views expressed by a member of the 
University's faculty and views, beliefs, and standards 
generally and commonly entertained and accepted. We 
believe that any responsible expression of views by the 
members of the faculty, even though unpopular and 
even, possibly, untenable, is in order. . . . 
We do not condemn Assistant Professor Koch's 
actions in issue here merely because he expressed in his 
letter views contrary to commonly accepted beliefs and 
standards. We condemn it because of the manner in 
which he expressed those views in his letter. We do not 
consider that letter as a "responsible" and proper expres- 
sion of the views stated in it. 
Events after Board of Trustees Decision 
On July 15, I960, a group of 229 members of the 
faculty on the Urbana-Champaign campus signed an 
Open Letter to the Board of Trustees. This letter stated, 
"The welfare of this University and its ability to fulfill 
its function as an institution of higher learning have been 
seriously impaired by the handling and disposition of the 
case of Professor Koch." It went on to make the follow- 
ing points: 
(1) In the mind of the public as well as in the 
final statement of t'he Board of Trustees, a basic charge 
against Professor Koch is still that contained in Presi- 
dent Henry's letter of April 7 - expression of opinions 
"offensive and repugnant" and "contrary to the commonly 
accepted standards of morality." These criteria are un- 
acceptable as limits on a professor's freedom of ex- 
pression. 
(2) By failure to follow proper procedures "the case 
may have been so prejudiced that no fair hearing was 
possible." 
(3) By largely rejecting the recommendations of the 
Champaign-Urbana Senate and its Committee on Aca- 
demic Freedom the President and the Board have failed 
to show adequate recognition of the responsibility which 
the faculty must have for the conduct of its members. 
The Open Letter concluded by urging the Board of 
Trustees "to give the faculty formal assurance: (1) 
that expression of opinion contrary to commonly accepted 
standards of morality is not considered cause for dismissal 
of a faculty member; (2) that the objectionable adminis- 
trative procedures followed in the case of Professor Koch 
will not be condoned in the future; and (3) that the 
primary consideration in cases involving tenure be the 
recommendations of established faculty agencies." 
The Open Letter was referred by the Board of Trustees 
to its Committee on General Policy. On September 21, 
I960, this Committee submitted its report, which was 
adopted by the full Board. The report stated that the 
basic charge against Professor Koch "was not that he 
expressed . . . views which were 'offensive and repugnant' 
and 
'contrary to the commonly accepted standards of 
morality' but was that his actions in writing the letter 
and securing its publication constituted a decided and 
serious breach of the academic responsibility inherent 
in his University employment" as declared in the Uni- 
versity Statutes and the 1940 Statement of Principles. 
The report went on to say: 
We would not be justified in saying, wholly without 
qualification, "that expression of opinion contrary to 
commonly accepted standards of morality is not con- 
sidered cause for dismissal of a faculty member." We 
do state that a responsible expression of such an opinion, 
made under proper circumstances and with due regard 
for the provisions of Sections 38 and 39 of the University 
Statutes, and for those of the above mentioned "Joint 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure" would not be so considered by us. In deter- 
mining whether such an expression of opinion is a "re- 
sponsible" one, and has been so made, the occasion for, 
the circumstances surrounding, and media used in 
publicly expressing the opinion, and the tone, content, 
and purpose of the public expression of it must be given 
due consideration. 
The report also defended the procedure followed in 
the case and stated, "We intend and stand ready to always 
accord due consideration, and substantial weight, to the 
opinions and recommendations of established faculty 
agencies in such cases," but that "final authority" rested 
with the Board. The report concluded: 
The reputation of the University of Illinois for 
scholarship and for academic integrity, in teaching and 
research, will remain the continuing concern of this 
Board of Trustees. This Board will receive, and will 
seriously and carefully consider, suggestions for main- 
taining and strengthening that reputation. The statutes 
of the University provide for an orderly procedure 
whereby such suggestions may be submitted to us and 
brought to our attention. 
Subsequently the Senate Committee on Academic Free- 
dom prepared a series of proposed amendments to the 
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University Statutes relating to academic freedom and 
tenure. These proposals include a revision of Section 
38 (d), dealing with cause for discharge, and establish 
detailed procedures in dismissal cases in lieu of the 
present provisions of Section 38 (e) and (f). The pro- 
posals have been considered and adopted by the three 
Senates of the University of Illinois (at the three 
campuses). After further consideration by the Academic 
Freedom Committees of the three Senates and the Uni- 
versity-wide Coordinating Council (a faculty group), it 
is believed that faculty agreement will be achieved. The 
amendments will then be transmitted to the Administra- 
tion. 
In March, 1961, counsel for Professor Koch filed a 
complaint in the Superior Court of Cook County alleging 
that the discharge constituted a breach of contract and 
a violation of constitutional rights, and seeking damages. 
The lower court dismissed the complaint, and the inter- 
mediate appellate court has affirmed. Further appeal is 
possible but appears not to have been made at the time 
these pages go to the printer. 
II. The Discharge: The Procedural Issues 
The case raises three major issues of procedure. These 
are whether academic due process was violated by (1) 
President Henry's letter of April 7; (2) a failure to 
state the charges with sufficient definiteness to enable 
Professor Koch to make his defense; and (3) a failure 
of the Board of Trustees to give sufficient weight to the 
findings and recommendations of the faculty, particularly 
the Senate Committee on Academic Freedom. 
A. President Henry's Letter of April 7 
President Henry's letter of April 7, quoted above, an- 
nounced that Professor Koch's appointment "will be 
terminated at the University at the end of the current 
academic year." The letter was released to the public. 
As previously noted, President Henry had no authority 
to terminate Professor Koch's appointment but only to 
prefer charges and to suspend "pending final decision 
of the Board upon the charges." The issue is whether 
this public announcement hat Professor Koch would be 
discharged, made before charges had been filed or heard, 
so prejudiced Professor Koch's case as to constitute a 
denial of academic due process. 
The Board of Trustees found, as set forth previously, 
that Professor Koch had received all procedural rights; 
that the public release of President Henry's letter was 
appropriate because of the publicity which Professor 
Koch's letter had received and because of the necessity 
to disavow his views; and that the release did not operate 
to Professor Koch's prejudice in the disposition of the 
charges. The Report of the Committee on General Policy, 
adopted by the Board of Trustees, further declared that 
"ordinarily" the Board would not approve of publication 
of charges prior to hearing, but that in this case "excep- 
tional circumstances" made it necessary and desirable. 
It also stated: 
President Henry has been unjustly accused of usurping 
the authority vested solely in the Board of Trustees and 
attempting to terminate Dr. Koch's contract upon his 
own authority. While some language appearing in Presi- 
dent Henry's letter of April 7, I960, to Dean Lanier 
might be interpreted to lend some support to this 
charge, President Henry has made it plain in statements 
he has made to the Trustees . . . that he intended that 
portion of his letter to constitute only a statement of his 
intention to submit a recommendation to the Board of 
Trustees that Dr. Koch's contract be terminated. . . 
Both President Henry and Dean Lanier were thoroughly 
familiar with the provisions of the University Statutes 
and we are convinced that President Henry intended that 
portion of his letter to be, and that it was so understood 
by Dean Lanier. Moreover, President Henry has assured 
us that he did not expect or intend that we would be 
committed by that portion of the letter to terminate Dr. 
Koch's contract, and we certainly did not consider our- 
selves to be bound by it to take that action. 
We do not feel that the Board's explanation fully 
meets the issue. In our view, the publication of President 
Henry's letter did seriously prejudice Professor Koch's 
case. While some members of the University administra- 
tion and faculty undoubtedly realized that President 
Henry had no authority to decide the issue of discharge, 
the general public impression was given that the matter 
had been disposed of by the University. The investigating 
committee has already noted that President Henry made 
no effort to clarify the situation. The result was that a 
difficult burden- was placed upon Professor Koch to re- 
verse the tide rolling over him, and both the Senate Com- 
mittee on Academic Freedom and the Board of Trustees 
were put in an embarrassing position where, as a practi- 
cal matter, it would be difficult for them to decide on the 
basis of a clean slate. 
We conclude, therefore, that President Henry's letter, 
with its ensuing publication, amounted to prejudgment 
of the issues, prior to charges and hearing, and thereby 
constituted a violation of academic due process. 
B. Sufficiency of the Charges 
President Henry's letter of April 7 was taken as a 
statement of the charges. While it was not clear from 
the letter, the Senate Committee on Academic Freedom 
interpreted the letter as incorporating by reference the 
letter of Dean Lanier to President Henry and its ac- 
companying material, these documents thus also becoming 
part of the statement of charges. The Board of Trustees, 
although not making the point clear, seems to have ac- 
cepted the Senate Committee's view. 
The charges as thus formulated certainly lacked pre- 
cision, clarity, and perhaps consistency. But in our view 
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Professor Koch was not prejudiced thereby. At the hear- 
ing before the Senate Committee he addressed himself 
to all the issues under consideration. At no time did he 
or his counsel request a more specific statement of the 
charges. There is no indication from the record or our 
investigation that Professor Koch suffered from a lack 
of understanding or an opportunity to meet the issues 
upon which the case was decided. Consequently we find 
no violation of due academic procedure in the manner 
of stating the charges. 
C. Failure of Board of Trustees to Give Sufficient Weight 
to Faculty Position 
It is difficult to define with precision the weight that 
the governing board of a university should accord to the 
findings and recommendations of the faculty on issues 
of academic freedom. But the general principle is clear. 
Matters of "academic responsibility," as well as issues 
of competency and other issues of academic freedom, 
should rest primarily with the judgment of the academic 
group and that judgment should be overturned by the 
governing board only if it is plainly unreasonable. We do 
not think the University administration complied with 
this fundamental principle in this case. 
We base this conclusion in part upon the fact that, 
as we read the Board of Trustees' decision, it fails to 
recognize the significance of the findings and recommen- 
dations of the Senate Committee on Academic Freedom. 
The Board states that the Senate Committee's "appraisal 
of [Professor Koch's] letter to The Daily lllini accords 
with ours"; it then goes on to say that "once it has been 
determined that Assistant Professor Koch's actions are 
not protected by his academic freedom, the question of 
what action should be taken against him because of his 
breach of his academic and professional responsibility 
and duty to the University is one which we have the 
responsibility, duty, and authority to determine." The 
Board thus conveys the impression that the Senate Com- 
mittee on Academic Freedom reached the same conclu- 
sion as the Board, except on the subsidiary issue of what 
the form of discipline should be. Actually, the Senate 
Committee's conclusion was quite different from that 
of the Board. The Senate Committee did find a "breach 
of academic responsibility"; but it found only the kind 
or degree of breach that would justify a reprimand. The 
Board found a wholly different kind of breach, one that 
warranted a discharge. Thus the Board, for all practical 
purposes, ignored the essence of the Senate Committee's 
position. 
Furthermore, in our view, the whole process leading 
to dismissal was conducted by the administrative authori- 
ties in isolation from the academic community, where the 
primary judgment should have rested. The first official 
action, other than Professor McCrimmon's reprimand, 
was taken by the Executive Committee of the College 
of Liberal Arts and Sciences, an elected body but one 
then consisting entirely of personnel at the department- 
head level and one not charged with consideration of 
academic freedom matters. This committee did not call 
in Professors McCrimmon or Kugler, or Professor Koch 
himself, though it did have the McCrimmon and Kugler 
memoranda before it. On the same day he received the 
Executive Committee's report, which split three to three 
on discharge without payment of salary for the second 
year of Professor Koch's contract, President Henry issued 
his letter which on its face appeared to dispose of the 
whole matter by dismissal. It was not until later, essen- 
tially when the matter was referred to the Senate Com- 
mittee, that the course of procedure required by the 
Unversity Statutes began to be followed. Even then, the 
Board of Trustees failed to consider the nature of the 
breach of academic responsibility found by the Senate 
Committee. Our impression is that the process was 
guided administratively without sufficient opportunity for 
participation and regard for the views of the academic 
group in the University. 
III. Other Issues 
The committee considers it important to call attention 
to three other matters relating to academic freedom and 
tenure at the University of Illinois. 
A. Tenure 
Section 38 of the University of Illinois Statutes states: 
(a) Unless otherwise provided in these Statutes (and 
in the absence of some special written agreement approved 
by the President of the University with the consent of 
the appointee) the tenure for the various members of 
the academic staff shall be as stated herein, except that 
first appointments or temporary appointments may be 
made for shorter periods. 
(1) An appointment as professor or associate pro- 
fessor shall be for an indefinite term. 
(2) An appointment as assistant professor, or to the 
administrative staff, shall be for a period not longer than 
two years from September 1 of the first year of the 
legislative biennium. 
(3) Appointments to lower ranks shall be for not 
more than one year. 
(b) The appointment of any person for a definite 
term does not carry any guarantee or implication that 
the Board of Trustees will renew the appointment at its 
termination, even though the appointee may have dis- 
charged his duties satisfactorily. Any appointment, if 
accepted, must be accepted with this stipulation. 
It will be noted that the University Statutes set no 
limit for the number or total duration of nontenure 
appointments, which are given to assistant professors 
and instructors. 
The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Free- 
dom and Tenure provides: 
Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time 
instructor or a higher rank, the probationary period 
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should not exceed seven years, including within this 
period full-time service in all institutions of higher 
education; but subject to the proviso that when, after a 
term of probationary service of more than three years 
in one or more institutions, a teacher is called to another 
institution it may be agreed in writing that his new 
appointment is for a probationary period of not more 
than four years, even though thereby the person's total 
probationary period in the academic profession is ex- 
tended beyond the normal maximum of seven years. 
Notice should be given at least one year prior to the 
expiration of the probationary period if the teacher is 
not to be continued in service after the expiration of 
that period. 
B. Suspension 
Section 38 (e) of the University of Illinois Statutes, 
as quoted previously, states: 
Prior to the preferment of charges, or while charges 
are pending, the appointee may be suspended by the 
President pending final decision of the Board upon the 
charges. 
The 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in 
Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, prepared by a joint com- 
mittee representing the Association of American Colleges 
and this Association as a, guide in dismissal proceedings, 
provides : 
Suspension of the faculty member during the pro- 
ceedings involving him is justified only if immediate harm 
to himself or others is threatened by his continuance. 
C. Notice and Terminal Pay 
The University of Illinois Statutes seem to be silent on 
the question of payment, under an existing contract or 
otherwise, for persons dismissed for cause. 
The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Free- 
dom and Tenure states: 
Teachers on continuous appointment who are dis- 
missed for reasons not involving moral turpitude should 
receive their salaries for at least a year from the date of 
notification of dismissal whether or not they are con- 
tinued in their duties at the institution. 
The Investigating Committee notes these differences 
between the University of Illinois Statutes and the prin- 
ciples, procedures, and standards which the Association 
supports, in relation to certain matters of tenure, suspen- 
sion, notice and terminal pay. It believes that the resolu- 
tion of these differences is a matter of appropriate concern 
to the administrative officers and faculty members of the 
University of Illinois. 
IV. Present Status of Academic Freedom at the 
University of Illinois 
It is the opinion of the committee that the Koch case 
has had serious repercussions on academic freedom at the 
University of Illinois. The committee was not, of course, 
able to make an exhaustive investigation beyond the facts 
of the Koch case itself. To have ascertained sentiment 
among a large and varied faculty would not have been 
an easy task, even if the committee had had the time and 
resources to undertake it. Such opinion as we did sound 
out was by no means unanimous. 
Nevertheless, we think it fair to say that there is 
substantial concern over the question whether the Univer- 
sity actually will permit untrammeled discussion of highly 
controversial issues, or whether freedom to express un- 
popular views will be seriously qualified by the test 
of "encouragement" and "academic responsibility." There 
is also serious concern over the procedure employed in 
the Koch case, particularly President Henry's precipitate 
action in announcing Professor Koch's discharge. The 
issues raised by the open letter signed by 229 faculty 
members have not been settled by the report of the Com- 
mittee on General Policy. Among the lower ranks of the 
faculty there appears to be some reluctance to oppose 
openly the actions of the administration in the Koch 
matter, or generally to espouse unorthodox or deviant 
views in controversial areas. 
We believe that an essential factor in restoring a freer 
atmosphere on the campus will be the outcome of present 
negotiations to revise the University Statutes dealing with 
academic freedom. If the substantive grounds for disci- 
pline can be narrowed and defined more precisely, and 
if the procedure can be clarified and stated more specifi- 
cally, substantial progress should result. Moreover, as has 
been noted, attention should be given to deficiency in the 
regulations governing tenure, suspension, and length of 
notice in dismissal of tenure faculty when moral turpitude 
is not involved. 
It would be our hope that, out of the Koch case, the 
University authorities will come to take a broader view 
of the function of a university and the value of academic 
freedom for the faculty and the student body. The Uni- 
versity of Illinois is a great university. Its concerns and 
contributions extend beyond the local to the national and 
international sphere. It must, of course, operate within 
the community in which it is located. But if it is to 
function on the scale and in the manner which it is 
capable, its top administration and its Board of Trustees 
must be ready to recognize its maturity, its ability to 
absorb a few gadflies, and its need for uninhibited free- 
dom of discussion. 
Thomas I. Emerson (Law), Yale University, Chairman 
Robert E. Butts (Philosophy), Bucknell University 
Harry J. Leon (Classics), University of Texas 
The Investigating Committee 
Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure has 
by vote authorized publication of this report in the AAUP 
Bulletin: 
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David Fellman (Political Science) , University of Wis- 
consin, Chairman. 
Members: Robert B. Brode (Physics), University of 
California at Berkeley; Frances C. Brown (Chemistry), 
Duke University; Clark Byse (Law), Harvard University; 
William P. Fidler (English), Washington Office; Ralph 
F. Fuchs (Law), Indiana University; Bentley Glass 
(Biology), The Johns Hopkins University; Louis Joughin 
(History), Washington Office; Harold W. Kuhn (Mathe- 
matics), Princeton University; Walter P. Metzger (His- 
tory), Columbia University; Glenn R. Morrow (Philos- 
ophy), University of Pennsylvania; Paul Oberst (Law), 
University of Kentucky; C. Herman Pritchett (Political 
Science), University of Chicago; Warren Taylor (Eng- 
lish), Oberlin College. 
Part II. "Academic Responsibility"; Statement of the Ad Hoc 
Committee in the Koch Case 
The report submitted to Committee A by the ad hoc 
investigating committee in the University of Illinois Koch 
case originally contained a fully developed section en- 
titled "The Discharge: The Substantive Issues/' This 
section dealt with the standard of "academic responsibil- 
ity^ as set forth in the 1940 Statement of Principles and 
in the University of Illinois Statutes, and the application 
of these standards by the University authorities in the 
Koch case. Necessarily, the ad hoc committee stated in its 
report its understanding of the standard of academic 
responsibility, particularly in relation to the Association 
position that a teacher should be free from institutional 
censorship when he writes or speaks as a citizen. 
Committee A consideration of the report, over a long 
period of time, revealed a variety of partial agreements, 
partial differences of emphasis, and partial disagreements 
with the view of the ad hoc committee on the subject of 
academic responsibility. There were also differences ap- 
parent among the members of Committee A. The solu- 
tion reached involves a three-part presentation: Part I 
(printed supra) , a report by the ad hoc investigating com- 
mittee fully agreed to by both that group and Committee 
A, covering the facts, the procedural issues, other issues, 
and the present status of academic freedom at the Univer- 
sity of Illinois; Part II, a statement by the ad hoc com- 
mittee on the substantive issues, embodying its views on 
the validity of the standard of academic responsibility and 
the application of such a standard in the Koch case; and 
Part III, a statement approved by a majority of Committee 
A in reference to Part II and a dissenting statement by a 
member of Committee A. 
Committee A wishes to continue thoughtful study of 
the standard of academic responsibility. It is indebted to 
the members of the ad hoc committee in the Koch case 
for their penetrating analysis of the issues involved; Com- 
mittee A will also be grateful to individual members of 
the Association who care to offer either general comment 
on the standard of academic responsibility, or on its 
application in the Koch case. 
The ad hoc committee believes that the substantive 
issues raised by the Koch case ought to be considered in 
any disposition of this matter. We appreciate, and hereby 
take advantage of, the offer of Committee A to state our 
views on this aspect of the case in the pages of the 
Bulletin. 
There is agreement among all parties that Professor 
Koch had the right to express his views, on sex mores 
as well as other subjects, even though his views were 
offensive or repugnant to others, or contrary to accepted 
standards of morality. And it seems to be agreed thai 
his right to express such views is not limited by the fact 
that his publication of them would be prejudicial to the 
interests of the University in the sense that it would 
arouse strong protest by alumni, parents, or other mem- 
bers of the community who disagreed with his position. 
Protection of this right is, of course, fundamental to the 
existence of academic freedom. 
The crucial substantive issue in this case arises out of 
the position taken by the university that only a "respon- 
sible" expression of views is protected under the princi- 
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pies of academic freedom, and that Professor Koch's 
expression here was not "responsible." The University 
defines this "academic responsibility," as we understand 
its position, as meaning conformity with the provisions 
of Section 39 (b) of the University of Illinois Statutes and 
Paragraph (c) of the 1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure. We quote Section 
39(b): 
In his role as citizen, the faculty member has the 
same freedoms as other citizens, without institutional 
censorship or discipline, although he should be mindful 
that accuracy, forthrightness, and dignity befit his asso- 
ciation with the University and his position as a man 
of learning. 
Paragraph (c) of the 1940 Statement reads as follows: 
The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member 
of a learned profession, and an officer of an educational 
institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he 
should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, 
but his special position in the community imposes special 
obligations. As a man of learning and an educational 
officer, he should remember that the public may judge 
his profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence 
he should at all times be accurate, should exercise 
appropriate restraint, should show respect for the 
opinions of others, and should make every effort to 
indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman. 
The issue raised is one of basic importance to the 
development of academic freedom in the United States.3 
The ad hoc committee is of the opinion that (1) as 
applied to a faculty member having definite or indefinite 
tenure, making public utterances on matters of general 
concern to the community, the standard of "academic res- 
ponsibility" is not a valid basis for reprimand, dismissal, 
or other official discipline; and (2) assuming such a 
standard to be valid in such a situation, its application 
in Professor Koch's case does not justify official discipline. 
We would therefore conclude that, in this respect also, the 
action of the University in suspending Professor Koch 
and terminating his contract constituted a breach of the 
principles of academic freedom. 
A. Validity of the Standard of "Academic Responsibility" 
We are dealing here with a member of the faculty 
having definite tenure under a contract which, at the 
time of publication of the letter, had more than a year 
to run. The letter in question was published by Professor 
Koch in his capacity as a citizen of the community and 
was addressed to an issue of general interest then under 
8 It should be noted that the position of the Board of Trustees 
is not altogether free of ambiguity. Thus the Board seems to 
consider the "content" of the Koch letter as relevant to the 
question of "responsibility." Furthermore, it is of course not 
possible here, as elsewhere, to draw a sharp line between 
substance and form. Nevertheless we believe the issue here to 
be essentially as we have stated it. 
discussion in the community. It was not written as a 
scholarly publication in Professor Koch's field of special 
competence, a problem with which we are not here con- 
cerned. It is our view that, in such a situation, a faculty 
member should have the same right of expression as any 
other citizen and that university discipline should not be 
invoked under any standard of "academic responsibility." 
Such sanctions as are appropriate in this situation are the 
unofficial judgment and pressures derived from the basic 
standards of the academic profession and the intellectual 
community. 
There can be no doubt that the ordinary citizen, ad- 
dressing himself to a matter of public concern, is not 
limited by any standard of "responsibility." Apart from 
the law of libel or similar legal restrictions - which are 
clearly not applicable here - there is no requirement that 
the citizen speak with restraint, dignity, respect for the 
opinion of others, or even accuracy. To impose any such 
official limitation would effectively cut off any real dis- 
cussion of controversial issues of either fact or opinion. 
This is a cardinal principle of freedom of expression. Its 
classical statement is that of John Stuart Mill, which de- 
serves quotation at some length: 
Before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion, it 
is fit to take some notice of those who say that the free 
expression of all opinions should be permitted, on condi- 
tion that the manner be temperate, and do not pass the 
bounds of fair discussion. Much might be said on the 
impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are 
to be placed; for if the test be offence to those whose 
opinions are attacked, I think experience testifies that 
this offence is given whenever the attack is telling and 
powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them 
hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears 
to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, 
an intemperate opponent. But this, though an important 
consideration in a practical point of view, merges in a 
more fundamental objection. Undoubtedly the manner 
of asserting an opinion, even though it be a true one, 
may be very objectionable, and may justly incur severe 
censure. But the principal offences of the kind are 
such as it is mostly impossible, unless by accidental self- 
betrayal, to bring home to conviction. The gravest of 
them is, to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or argu- 
ments, to misstate the elements of the case, or mis- 
represent the opposite opinion. But all this, even to the 
most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect 
good faith, by persons who are not considered, and in 
many other respects may not deserve to be considered, 
ignorant or imcompetent, that it is rarely possible, on 
adequate grounds, conscientiously to stamp the misrepre- 
sentation as morally culpable; and still less could law 
presume to interfere with this kind of controversial mis- 
conduct. With regard to what is commonly meant by 
intemperate discussion, namely invective, sarcasm, per- 
sonality, and the like, the denunciation of these weapons 
would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed 
to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only 
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desired to restrain the employment of them against the 
prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not 
only be used without general disapproval, but will be 
likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of 
honest zeal and righteous indignation. Yet whatever 
mischief arises from their use, is greatest when they are 
employed against the comparatively defenseless; and 
whatever unfair advantage can be derived by any opinion 
from this mode of asserting it, accrues almost exclusively 
to received opinions. The worst offence of this kind 
which can be committed by a polemic, is to stigmatize 
those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral 
men. To calumny of this sort, those who hold any 
unpopular opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they 
are in general few and uninfluential, and nobody but 
themselves feels much interested in seeing justice done 
them; but this weapon is, from the nature of the case, 
denied to those who attack a prevailing opinion; they 
can neither use it with safety to themselves, nor, if they 
could, would it do anything but recoil on their own 
cause. In general, opinions contrary to those commonly 
received can only obtain a hearing by studied modera- 
tion of language, and the most cautious avoidance of 
unnecessary offence, from which they hardly ever deviate 
even in a slight degree without losing ground: while 
unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of the 
prevailing opinion, really does deter people from pro- 
fessing contrary opinions, and from listening to those 
who profess them. For the interest, therefore, of truth 
and justice, it is far more important to restrain this 
employment of vituperative language than the other; 
and, for example, if it were necessary to choose, there 
would be much more need to discourage offensive attacks 
on infidelity than on religion. It is, however, obvious 
that law and authority have no business with restraining 
either. . . .4 
These considerations seem to us fully applicable to 
the exercise of official sanctions by a university against 
members of the academic profession. It is true that a 
faculty member can never completely dissociate himself 
from the institution to which he belongs. Nevertheless, 
it is also true that the community now recognizes, or can 
be educated to recognize, that expressions of individual 
faculty members on controversial public issues are not 
to be attributed to the university. Moreover, whatever 
tarnish rubs off on the university by reason of an im- 
moderate statement of an offensive idea, would hardly be 
greater than that accruing from a consummately polished, 
and hence more persuasive, statement of the same idea. 
Yet it is conceded by all that the latter "burden," if it 
can be called that, is one the university must bear. We 
fail to see, therefore, why the university need stand censor 
over the language and tone of its faculty members, 
rather than leaving to traditional guild pressures the 
maintenance of a respectable level of discourse. 
On the other hand much harm can come from 
application of university sanctions to the manner in which 
public controversy is carried on by faculty members. The 
concept of "irresponsibility" is exceedingly vague. Any 
one of us can easily call to mind statements by our 
colleagues which might be termed by some as un- 
restrained, undignified, or lacking respect for the opinion 
of others. Any serious application of the standard would 
tend to eliminate or discourage any colorful or forceful 
utterance. More likely, as Mill observes, the standard 
would be reserved as a sanction only for expression of 
unorthodox opinion. 
As we read Section 39 (b) of the Illinois Statutes, the 
notion of academic responsibility, when the faculty mem- 
ber is speaking as a citizen, is intended to be an admoni- 
tion rather than a standard for the application of dis- 
cipline. That provision declares flatly that "the faculty 
member has the same freedoms as other citizens, without 
institutional censorship or discipline," and states the 
qualification of academic responsibility only as one of 
which the faculty member "should be mindful." 
The 1940 Statement of Principles appears to us 
ambiguous on this point. On its face Paragraph (c) 
merely says that the faculty member speaking as a 
citizen has "special obligations" which he "should re- 
member" and "should" adhere to. On the other hand 
the legislative history of the provision points somewhat 
in the other direction. A 1938 draft of the document 
contained an express statement that the judgment of what 
constitutes fulfillment of these obligations should rest 
with the individual; this was eliminated in the 1940 
Statement.5 An interpretation adopted at the conference 
of representatives of the AAUP and the Association of 
American Colleges, which approved the 1940 Statement, 
reads : 
3. If the administration of a college or university feels 
that a teacher has not observed the admonitions of 
Paragraph (c) of the section on Academic Freedom 
and believes that the extramural utterances of the 
teacher have been such as to raise grave doubts 
concerning his fitness for his position, it may pro- 
ceed to file charges under Paragraph (a) (4) of 
the section on Academic Tenure. In pressing such 
charges the administration should remember that 
teachers are citizens and should be accorded the 
freedom of citizens. In such cases the administra- 
tion must assume full responsibility and the Ameri- 
can Association of University Professors and the 
Association of American Colleges are free to make 
an investigation. 
The first sentence of this interpretation appears to 
elevate the "special obligations" of the faculty member 
speaking as citizen to a standard of discipline to be 
4 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Neff ed., 1926), pp. 63-4. 
5 See Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, The 
Development of Academic Freedom in the United States (1955), 
p. 487. 
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applied by the university administration. But the next 
sentence - stating that in such proceedings the faculty 
member "should be accorded the freedom of citizens" 
- is squarely inconsistent. It is true that, outside an 
academic freedom context, the "freedom of citizens" 
would not protect a citizen from economic penalties, but 
only from legal sanctions. But in an academic freedom 
context university discipline is the equivalent of legal 
sanction. Hence to say that faculty members should have 
the same "freedom" as citizens must mean that university 
discipline cannot be applied where legal sanctions would 
not be. Otherwise the sentence would seem to have no 
meaning. In short the "interpretation" appears to be a 
compromise which actually left the matter unresolved. 
It is hard to believe that the 1940 Statement of 
Principles means that faculty members are subject to 
discipline for infraction of such vague "admonitions" 
as being "accurate," exercising "appropriate restraint," 
or showing "respect for the opinions of others." In 
any event, for the reasons we have given, we believe that 
the principle as we have construed it is the sound one 
and the only one consistent with the attainment of 
acedemic freedom. 
B. Application of the Standard of "Academic Respon- 
sibility" in This Case 
Assuming the validity of the standard of "academic 
responsibility," the ad hoc committee is of the view that 
application of the standard in this case does not justify 
disciplinary action by the University. 
As we understand the decision of the Board of 
Trustees, it holds that the publication of the letter 
constituted a breach of academic responsibility on two 
principal grounds: (1) that Professor Koch intended to 
and did encourage and espouse immoral and illegal acts 
on the part of students at the University; and (2) that 
the letter was not a reasoned statement but was intem- 
perate, undignified, and lacking in respect for the 
opinions of others. The Board also urges at one point 
a third ground: (3) that, although Professor Koch in- 
serted his academic title following his signature, he 
"made no effort to make plain in his letter that it con- 
tained only his individual views and that he was not 
writing it as a spokesman for the University." We 
consider these points in order. 
1. Encouragement of immorality and illegality. There 
was no evidence before the Board of Trustees other than 
the letter itself, that Professor Koch "intended" to 
encourage immoral or illegal acts on the part of students. 
Before the Senate Committee on Academic Freedom 
Professor Koch stated he had no such intention. The 
issue must therefore be considered on the basis of the 
wording of the letter. 
Every forceful expression of an idea is an encourage- 
ment to act upon it. As Justice Holmes has said, 
"Every idea is an incitement." To say that a faculty 
member may express unorthodox ideas, but is violating 
academic responsibility if his ideas encourage action, 
renders the right of expression meaningless. Perhaps 
a line must be drawn somewhere, although we do not 
see any satisfactory way of drawing it short of the point 
where expression becomes an illegal solicitation to crime, 
a point certainly not reached here. But the prohibition 
surely cannot extend to everything which falls within 
the term "encouragement" or "espousal." And we see 
nothing in the letter which constituted encouragement 
or espousal beyond what naturally adheres to a vigorous 
presentation of the ideas that Professor Koch was en- 
deavoring to put forward. 
Counsel for the University argues that Professor Koch 
was challenging students to act when he said that college 
students seemed to him to be "acting with remarkable 
decorum, and surprising meekness, if they do no more 
than neck at their social functions"; and that such 
behavior "indicates an extreme degree of brainwashing 
by our religious and civil authorities." This is strong 
language. But it does not seem to us to carry "encourage- 
ment" beyond the bounds of vigorous expression of an 
idea. Actually, Professor Koch's conclusion was not 
couched in terms of urging but in terms of condoning 
under certain circumstances: "there is no valid reason 
why sexual intercourse should not be condoned among 
those sufficiently mature to engage in it without social 
consequences and without violating their own codes of 
morality and ethics." 
We would conclude, therefore, that a finding of 
academic irresponsibility on grounds of encouragement 
and espousal in this situation amounts to little more 
than, through a back-door route, foreclosing expression 
of the ideas themselves. 
2. Intemperateness. The Board of Trustees' second 
major ground for finding a breach of academic re- 
sponsibility goes to the form and tone of the letter. 
This conclusion rests upon a number of subsidiary points: 
(a) The Board found that Professor Koch's letter 
"was not a reasoned statement, marshalling evidence 
in support of views held by him." If the letter be taken 
as a scientific essay on the problem of sex mores the 
objection might have some weight. But plainly the letter 
was not so intended. Like the letter to which it was 
a response, it was a comment and expression of views 
upon a broad problem under discussion on the campus. 
As such, it seems to include as much reasoning as letters 
of this nature customarily do. In any case, it is difficult 
to see how the question of the reasonableness of a view 
is related to the question of a person's freedom to express 
it. Clearly Professor Koch believed the views to which 
he gave expression, and the letter gives every indication 
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that he stood ready to discuss at length the evidential 
merits of his position. 
(b) The Board also found that the letter used "over- 
statement and ridicule." These techniques are frequently 
employed in academic and public discussions, often by 
our most respected writers. The success of the techniques, 
as might be expected, varies, and Mill's position quoted 
earlier states the general rule of such variation: over- 
statement and ridicule are normally acceptable when 
used against unpopular views, normally unacceptable 
when used against popular ones. Clearly such standards 
must be rejected in the interests of genuine freedom 
of expression. In any event Professor Koch's letter does 
not seem to go beyond customary limits in the use of 
overstatement and ridicule. 
(c) Another Board objection is that Professor Koch 
"denounced society as depraved [and] condemned as 
inhumane and obsolete the widely accepted moral 
standards derived from the Christian code of ethics and 
the commonly accepted moral standards then prevailing 
in the community." Many scholars, more profound than 
Professor Koch, have similarly denounced existing social 
patterns and condemned current moral standards. More- 
over, the Board's objection here goes to the ideas pre- 
sented, not to their form. It perhaps ought to be 
emphasized in this connection that if a great liberal 
university is to make its maximum long-term contribution 
to society both locally and beyond its peculiar environ- 
ment, one of its chief roles must be that of critic of 
society. Both the life of a university and the life of the 
society of which it is a part depend upon successful 
expression of this role. A great university is not a 
shepherd the members of whose flock are expected to 
confine themselves to "commonly accepted ideas"; ideally, 
it is an enlightened and lively center of investigation 
and controversy. If it falls too far short of this ideal, 
the very concept of academic freedom in such an institu- 
tion becomes degraded into meaninglessness. 
(d) The next objection is that Professor Koch 
"castigated those who might disagree with his conclusions 
as outrageously ignorant," and thus failed to show 
"respect for the opinions of others." But Professor 
Koch's disagreement with the opinions held by others 
does not seem to be of any different scale or temper 
from what one frequently finds expressed in public 
controversy and often academic controversy. Again Mill's 
position supplies the pragmatic maxim: we do not object 
to the castigation as "outrageously ignorant" of those 
holding views contrary to our own views. The implica- 
tion seems clear enough that in this conclusion also the 
Board intrinsically appeals to the unacceptability of the 
ideas themselves, not to Professor's Koch's supposedly 
intemperate manner of expressing them. 
(e) The Board further finds that the language of the 
letter was not in keeping with proper standards of 
"temperateness" and "dignity." Again, if one puts aside 
the substantive ideas expressed, we are unable to see 
wherein the letter varies in tone from frequent letters 
to the editor published by faculty members and others. 
The standard of responsibility applied in this way would 
make many of our more colorful and indeed educationally 
effective academicians subject to discipline, leaving the 
field to the dull and the innocuous. 
(f) Finally, the Board states that the contents of the 
letter were not "accurate." But the letter is largely an 
expression of an opinion which some hold to be sound 
and many others do not. The test of accuracy has no 
real application to such circumstances. This is especially 
the case since much that Professor Koch contends in his 
letter will be scientifically controversial for some time to 
come. The test of a controversial theory extends beyond 
the question of the accuracy of its statement. The 
Copernican astronomy, when first stated, was not accurate 
in all particulars, but it would have been the height of 
folly to restrain its public expression for that reason. 
Generally speaking, it seems clear to us that, had the 
letter dealt with any subject other than sex mores, 
religion, or some other acutely sensitive area, its language 
and tone would have passed unnoticed. We do not 
believe that a faculty member writing on these subjects 
should be held to higher standards of responsibility than 
one writing on less controversial topics. In any event 
we are convinced that fundamentally the objections of 
the Board of Trustees are directed against the "offensive 
and repugnant" views expressed, rather than the style 
of composition. This would appear to have been the 
reaction also of President Henry, as conveyed in his letter 
of April 7. Once one excludes from consideration the 
"offensive" nature of the substantive ideas in Professor 
Koch's letter, as it is conceded the principles of academic 
freedom require, the finding of a breach of academic 
responsibility because of language and tone seems to us 
wholly untenable. 
3. Professor Koch as Institutional spokesman. The 
Board of Trustee's finding that Professor Koch, by 
giving his academic title along with his signature, did 
not make it clear that he was not an institutional spokes- 
man, appears to us without merit. Surely no reader could 
have thought that Professor Koch was expressing the 
University's point of view. Moreover, it was not ex- 
ceptional for a faculty member to identify himself in 
writing letters to the editor, and the University did not 
object to this practice. In this instance the use of the 
title actually made little practical difference as Professor 
Koch could readily be identified from the faculty directory 
by most of the readers of The Daily lllini. 
Thomas I. Emerson, Yale University, Chairman 
Robert E. Butts, Bucknell University 
Harry J. Leon, University of Texas 
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Part III. "Academic Responsibility"; Comments by Members of 
Committee A Incident to Consideration of the Koch Case 
Committee A believes that it should be perfectly clear 
to any fair-minded observer, from the ad hoc committee's 
account of the facts of this case, that Professor Koch 
was denied academic due process by the Administration 
of the University of Illinois. Professor Koch was dis- 
charged by President Henry without notice of charges 
or a hearing, and then was given a hearing in an environ- 
ment strongly colored by the President's discharge action 
and by widespread publication of the letter in which the 
discharge was announced. It was extremely unfortunate, 
and damaging to Professor Koch, that during the whole 
period following publication of President Henry's initial 
letter of discharge the issue of confidence in the Presi- 
dent's judgment cast its shadow over all other issues. 
Under these circumstances Professor Koch's procedural 
rights were irretrievably compromised. Another hearing 
cannot mitigate the error, because a fair hearing cannot be 
held so long as the essentially irrelevant but powerful 
issue of confidence in the President remains in the 
picture. 
In Part II of this report the ad hoc committee spells 
out its position on the substantive issue of "academic 
responsibility." These are the views of able men dedi- 
cated to intellectual freedom, and they are entitled to 
great respect. Therefore, Committee A has authorized 
their publication. They cannot, however, be accepted by 
Committee A. 
Academic responsibility is admittedly very difficult to 
define. Nevertheless, we can hardly expect academic 
freedom to endure unless it is matched by academic 
responsibility. The question here at issue is whether 
academic responsibility is necessarily and entirely a con- 
cept which a faculty member applies to his own conduct 
by his own standards, or whether a faculty or administra- 
tive body can properly impose sanctions on a faculty 
member for a violation of what it considers to be the 
standard of academic responsibility. Whatever the 
answer, the primary source of any decent level of 
academic responsibility will, of course, always be the 
individual conscience. 
A university faculty and administration have a legiti- 
mate interest in the maintenance of proper standards of 
faculty responsibility on the part of all members of the 
academic community. Are "traditional guild pressures," 
as the ad hoc committee holds, all that should be per- 
mitted in order to maintain such a standard? The 
borderline between expression of views and the condon- 
ing, encouragement, or incitement of improper acts is 
tenuous and difficult to draw, but situations do occur in 
which a distinction must be made. For a judgment of that 
kind, recourse should be had in the first instance to a 
committee of the faculty. Both traditionally and practically, 
it is the duty and within the particular competence of the 
faculty to make the distinction and to recommend any 
appropriate action. Such judgment and action were sub- 
stantially accomplished in this case by the committee of 
the University of Illinois Senate, even though administra- 
tive prejudgment preceded and over-ruling followed the 
faculty committee hearing, findings, and conclusions. 
The legislative history of the 1940 Statement of Prin- 
ciples demonstrates that the views expressed by the 
authors of the report in their supplementary statement, 
Part II, relating to the concept of academic responsibility, 
did not prevail when the 1940 Statement was formulated. 
The 1925 Conference Statement on Academic Freedom 
and Tenure contained a provision for submitting "to an 
appropriate body of the faculty" a case involving the 
extramural utterances of a teacher which "raise grave 
doubts concerning his fitness for his position." During 
the joint committee discussions with representatives of 
the Association of American Colleges (the AAC), which 
preceded the formulation of the 1940 Statement, the 
AAUP committeemen argued that this provision should 
be eliminated, and in its stead there should be a clause 
conceding that the judgment "should rest with the in- 
dividual" as to what constitutes propriety of extramural 
utterance. The substitute was rejected by the AAC repre- 
sentatives who argued that individual judgment on this 
question was not sufficient, and that charges relating to 
allegedly improper utterance should be heard by some 
impartial extra-institutional tribunal rather than by a 
committee of colleagues of the accused. 
In response to the AAC objections, General Secretary 
Himstead replied that the administration always had 
the right, when it believed that professors went too far 
in their extramural utterances, to bring charges under the 
rules of tenure. In taking this position, which proved 
acceptable to the AAC representatives, the AAUP con- 
ceded a defeat for the proponents of complete guild 
autonomy and individual judgment in this area. The 
joint committee recorded its consensus on this question 
in a footnote "Interpretation," quoted earlier by the 
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authors of this report (page 37). The ad hoc committee 
correctly judges the "Interpretation" to be a compromise, 
but Committee A cannot agree that the issue in question 
actually was left unresolved, as the ad hoc committee con- 
cludes. In the light of Committee A's understanding of 
the 1940 Statement, together with the legislative history 
of the document and its 
"Interpretation," the Committee 
disagrees with the conclusion of the authors of the report 
that "the notion of academic responsibility, when the 
faculty member is speaking as a citizen, is intended to 
be an admonition rather than a standard for the applica- 
tion of discipline." In accepting this standard, however, 
Committee A understands by "application of discipline" 
only such action as may properly derive from the use of 
academic due process - i.e., the presentation of charges, 
and a subsequent faculty committee hearing resulting in 
a judgment. 
The policy of permitting disciplinary action to be 
initiated by the administration is not likely to result in 
impairment of free utterance by faculty members if 
under established academic traditions and procedures the 
initial and primary judgment of an accused individual's 
action rests with his colleagues. In the words of the 
1915 Declaration of Principles, "in matters of opinion, 
and of the utterance of opinion, . . . [lay governing] 
boards cannot intervene without destroying, to the extent 
of their intervention, the essential nature of a university 
- without converting it from a place dedicated to open- 
ness of mind, in which the conclusions expressed are the 
tested conclusions of trained scholars, into a place barred 
against the access of new light, and precommitted to the 
opinions or prejudices of men who have not been set 
apart or expressly trained for the scholar's duties." 
Committee A recognizes that institutions may abuse 
the power to discipline faculty members for established 
breaches of academic responsibility, but the possibility 
that power may be abused is not a proper ground for 
denying its existence. The remedy is, instead, insistence 
on proper procedural safeguards, a highly significant role 
for the faculty in the exercise of the power, and a 
vigilant oversight by this Association. Oversight by the 
Association in this sensitive area will, of course, include 
examination and review of faculty as well as administra- 
tive action. 
Committee A concludes that the Administration of the 
University of Illinois did not err in proceeding on the 
assumption that a violation of academic responsibility on 
the part of a faculty member fell within the disciplinary 
powers of the institution. Committee A also concludes 
that the University of Illinois Senate Committee on 
Academic Freedom had jurisdiction in this case. 
Whether one agrees with the Illinois Senate Com- 
mittee that Professor Koch violated proper standards of 
academic responsibility, and therefore should have been 
reprimanded, or with the ad hoc committee that there 
was no violation of academic responsibility, it is clear 
to Committee A that the sanction of discharge was 
outrageously severe and completely unwarranted. 
Committee A does not conceive it to be its function 
to decide independently whether the ad hoc committee or 
the Illinois Senate Committee is correct in its assessment 
of Professor Koch's action. Reasonable minds dedicated 
to intellectual freedom could - and do - differ on this 
issue. The important point is not that there are differences 
of opinion concerning the question whether Professor 
Koch's action warranted imposition of the sanction of 
reprimand or whether his action did not justify imposi- 
tion of any sanction whatsoever. The crucial fact is the 
unanimous agreement of the Illinois Senate Committee, 
the ad hoc committee, and Committee A that Professor 
Koch should not have been discharged. 
The following members of Committee A approve 
Part HI, the foregoing comments, for publication: David 
Fellman (Political Science), University of Wisconsin, 
Chairman; Frances C. Brown (Chemistry), Duke Uni- 
versity; Clark Byse (Law), Harvard University; William 
P. Fidler (English), Washington Office; Ralph F. Fuchs 
(Law), Indiana University; Bentley Glass (Biology), 
The Johns Hopkins University; Louis Joughin (History), 
Washington Office; Paul Oberst (Law), University of 
Kentucky; C. Herman Pritchett (Political Science), Uni- 
versity of Chicago, Professor Glenn R. Morrow (Philos- 
ophy, University of Pennsylvania), a member of the 
Committee during the period in which consideration was 
given to the report of the investigating committee, 
although not now a member, also approves. 
Professor Warren Taylor (English), Oberlin College, 
a present member of the Committee, dissents. Professor 
Walter P. Metzger (History), Columbia University, a 
present member of the Committee asks to be recorded 
as not voting. Professors Richard P. Adams (English), 
Tulane University, Fritz Machlup (Economics), Prince- 
ton University, and John P. Roche (Political Science), 
Brandeis University, present members of the Committee 
did not participate in consideration of the case. Professors 
Robert B. Brode (Physics), University of California, 
and Harold W. Kuhn (Mathematics), Princeton Uni- 
versity, members of the Committee during the period in 
which consideration was given to the report of the 
investigating committee, although not now members, 
dissent; Professor Brode concurs with Part II, the state- 
ment of the ad hoc committee. 
Professor Ralph F. Fuchs asks that the following foot- 
note to the Committee A comments, Part HI, be 
appended: 
"Mr. Fuchs wishes to supplement his concurrence by 
recording his view that the statement of Committee A 
should emphasize that institutional discipline for an 
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utterance allegedly violating the 'standard of academic 
responsibility' in the 1940 Statement of Principles cannot 
validly call in question the facts or opinions set forth 
by a faculty member. A violation may consist of serious 
intemperateness of expression, intentional falsehood, in- 
citement of misconduct, or conceivably some other im- 
propriety of circumstance. It may not lie, however, in 
the error or unpopularity, even though gross, of the ideas 
contained in an utterance." 
Professor Warren Taylor asks that the following 
dissent {in which Professor Erode concurs) be appended: 
As a member of Committe A, I am unable to agree 
with the interpretation of the Association's 1940 State- 
ment of Principles which is stated in Part III of the 
Koch-Illinois report. The issue, as I see it, is on what 
grounds an administration may justly bring charges 
against a teacher for expressing his opinions, charges 
which, when substantiated by due process, may justify 
suspension or dismissal. The only ground for such dis- 
ciplinary action that I can find in the 1940 Statement 
is unfitness to teach. I do not believe that the 1940 
Statement supports those of my colleagues who, in Part 
III, find in it a new standard, a standard of "academic 
responsibility," which they call, using the phrase from 
the ad hoc committee's report, "a standard of discipline." 
This means that a teacher judged by due process to have 
violated the supposed standard of "academic respon- 
sibility" in the expression of his opinion may, for that 
statement of opinion, be justly dismissed. 
This erroneous interpretation of the 1940 Statement 
presupposes but does not enumerate special standards for 
the discipline of teachers in the expression of their 
opinions which do not apply to all other citizens. The 
1940 Statement, however, says explicitly and later repeats 
the principle that teachers are citizens, and in the expres- 
sion of their opinions, should be accorded the same 
freedom accorded by law to all other citizens. Self- 
restraint is the individual teacher's own problem. By- 
law, in the expression of his opinions, the teacher is no 
less free than other citizens. 
All citizens, including professors, express their opinions 
publicly at their own peril. Judgments of their utterances 
will vary as greatly as those who judge them. Anyone 
who opens the windows of his mind cannot be too 
surprised if some throw stones. That is in the domain of 
public discourse, without penalties to enforce conformity. 
Freedom of speech is not a one-way flow of discourse. 
It includes freedom to disagree and to disapprove, also 
without penalty. A university faculty is free to disagree 
with and to disapprove the opinions of a teacher. But 
to pillory any citizen, including a professor, because he 
has stated an unpopular or heterodox view not proscribed 
by law, is at once, in that degree, to convert a free society 
into a totalitarian society. 
Part III does not define the supposed standard of 
"academic responsibility." It does not show precisely 
how "admonitions," which are not in themselves 
standards, are transformed into standards. It does not 
clarify this new concept by giving relevant particulars: 
specific instances and specific offenses. It does not answer 
the pertinent question: "What specific expression of 
opinion by a teacher violates the standard of academic 
responsibility and thereby warrants suspension or dis- 
missal?" 
This new standard was framed, I believe, in forgetful- 
ness of Occam's razor. Its proponents have postulated as 
existing a test for discipline which was not earlier known 
to exist. "Academic responsibility" in the expression of 
opinion as "a standard of discipline" is not mentioned 
as ground for adverse action in the special report of 
1956, "Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for 
National Security" (AAUP Bulletin, Spring, 1956, pp. 
57-8). They have multiplied tests unnecessarily and have 
not validated new formulations. I am unable to find in 
the 1940 Statement either an implied or an explicitly 
stated standard of "academic responsibility" which may 
be cited to restrain the teacher as citizen in the expression 
of his opinions. Consequently, I am unable to agree with 
those members of Committee A who conclude that, on 
the basis of the 1940 Statement, "the Administration of 
the University of Illinois did not err in proceeding on 
the assumption that a violation of academic responsibility 
on the part of a faculty member fell within the dis- 
ciplinary powers of the institution." 
In its support of basic principles and procedures which 
seek to assure academic freedom and tenure for the pro- 
fession, the Association has never denied that educational 
institutions have the right and power to appoint and 
dismiss teachers. The Association has never set up criteria 
for appointments. It has never questioned that established 
dereliction of duty and professional incompetence are 
valid tests for dismissal. These two, singly or in combina- 
tion, have, in practice, for the Association, constituted 
unfitness to teach. Such unfitness, the Association has 
held and now holds, must be established by due process. 
There is, historically, one test for dismissal: demonstrated 
unfitness to teach. 
The 1940 Statement of Principles says nothing about 
a special standard of "academic responsibility" in a 
teacher's expression of his opinion which, when violated, 
may lead to discipline. It says that teachers as citizens 
should be accorded the freedom of citizens. It reminds 
them, as admonition, and not as standards of discipline, 
that all teachers who state their opinions publicly, as do 
all citizens, do so at their own peril and that teachers 
may best protect themselves and their views by being 
accurate, exercising restraint and respecting the opinions 
of others. The 1940 Statement sets up no appropriate 
penalties for inaccuracy, disrespect, or a lack of restraint. 
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It labels its precautions explicitly as "admonitions," not 
as "standards of discipline." The appended interpreta- 
tion then spells out a procedure for administrators who 
believe that a professor's extramural utterances raise 
doubts concerning his fitness for his position. For the 
1940 Statement to have any consistency at all and freedom 
from contradiction this can only mean that the teacher's 
public expression of his opinions may become ground 
for moving towards his dismissal when and only when 
those opinions reveal unfitness to teach: what may be 
established as dereliction of duty and professional in- 
competence. The single standard of fitness to teach 
remains. A second standard of "academic responsibility" 
does not actually emerge. 
In seeking to multiply tests for the expression of 
opinion Committee A has already run into the same kind 
of difficulties encountered by the most eminent jurists who 
have faced the question. Debate over Justice Holmes's 
test of "clear and present danger" continues. And 
Justice Brandeis's tightening of the test in 1927 to make 
the danger apprehended by the words so imminent that 
catastrophe might befall before full discussion could 
occur has not settled the matter, finally, any more than 
Judge Hand's "gravity of evil." To speak of "academic 
responsibility" as a standard or test for dismissal because 
a teacher has expressed an unpopular opinion without 
anchoring it to unmistakable particulars is to waver on 
a floating bog of semantics. 
In my opinion, Committee A should not seek to 
multiply needless standards, too general and too abstract 
to be useful in examining cases. The Association actually 
possesses no codification of alleged violations of freedom 
of speech. Nor should it seek one. When an administra- 
tor believes that a teacher's utterances actually reveal an 
unfitness to teach, he may file charges. "In pressing such 
charges the administration should remember that teachers 
are citizens and should be accorded the freedom of 
citizens. In such cases the administration must assume 
responsibility" and the Association is "free to make an 
investigation" of that administration's findings and 
action. That is what the appended interpretation to the 
1940 Statement actually says. The entire statement is 
free from any listing of specific offenses and penalties 
in the expression of opinion. 
That is entirely appropriate for two reasons. In 
considering cases, Committee A has to view and review 
each on its own merits. Formulae, precedents, bureau- 
cratic decree, and abstract essences are all unavailing. 
The real distinction achieved over the past half century 
by Committee A stems in large measure, not from its 
multiplying standards, but rather from its exacting 
examination, in its search for fairness to all, of each 
case on its own merits. The second reason is that neither 
the Association nor a university possesses legislative 
and judicial power to restrain the citizen's expression of 
opinion. Misconstruing their function is a serious error 
that should be constantly corrected. In a free society, the 
state itself restrains only those utterances which threaten 
its very existence. Beyond legal restraints, the state has 
no favored opinions. In a free society, neither the state 
nor educational institutions possess the power to penalize 
or coerce conformity in the opinions of teachers as 
citizens. The university in a free society, as a free 
institution, has no favored political, economic, or sectarian 
opinions: Republican or Democratic; Keynesian or class- 
ical; Protestant, Catholic, non-believer, Moslem, Jew, or 
Hindu. The province of a free university is to make 
opinions and arguments known and to supply students 
with the knowledge and competence by which all opinions 
and arguments may be judged. 
To interpret the 1940 Statement of Principles, follow- 
ing the opinion expressed in Part III, as setting up in 
the exercise of free speech a special standard of "academic 
responsibility" for teachers, not binding on other citizens, 
as a standard for suspension or dismissal is to open a 
Pandora's box of all the coercive and compulsive crusades 
of sectarian, political, and economic pressure groups to- 
gether with consequent attempts at dismissal by admin- 
istrators who are unable to resist the public pressure 
engendered by such groups whose causes often contain 
more heat than light. 
The Association, I am confident, has been wise in not 
actually undertaking to set up and attempt to defend a 
standard of "academic responsibility" as a standard of 
discipline or to sanction dismissal for the expression of 
opinion. For history is strewn with the victims of 
"standards of discipline" in the expression of opinion 
from Socrates and Jesus and Joan of Arc to the victims 
of the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798, the Espionage 
Act of 1917, and the Sedition Act of 1918 on to the 
victims of totalitarian coercion of opinion during this 
century. There is no need now to seek or to create a 
new standard to silence teachers. To fire a teacher for 
his utterances the administrator cannot rely on such an 
ambiguous test as that of "academic responsibility." The 
opinions of a teacher as citizen are not enough to justify 
termination. The administrator will have to establish 
proof that beyond the utterance lies unfitness to teach: 
professional incompetence, dereliction of duty. Freedom 
of speech for all remains one basic principle of free 
societies. Freedom of speech for all remains one basic 
American principle. The Association remains an Ameri- 
can association. 
Warren Taylor 
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